Howard\u27s Way by Davis, Mark
6 BRIEFINGS
Howard’s Way
It's little wonder the only thing John Howard wanted 
to say about the dispute at Associated Pulp and Paper 
Mills (APPM) was that politicians should keep out of 
it. The dispute's result is a headache for the Coalition, 
which has been arguing that its plans to radically 
deregulate the labour market will usher in a brave 
new world of harmonious and productive workplace 
relations. For what was really at stake in the APPM 
dispute was not a union wage claim or the employer's 
keenness to overhaul work practices, but the more 
fundamental issue of union representation.
The dispute began in February when 
APPM cancelled a series of over­
award industrial agreements it had 
struck over the years with its unions, 
arguing that they were preventing 
line management from improving ef­
ficiency. APPM  said it was only 
prepared to recognise and deal with 
the unions to the extent it was re­
quired to do so under industrial 
awards and other legal instruments. 
From the outset, the company insisted 
it was happy to 'talk' directly with its 
employees over the changes it was 
seeking in work practices. But it 
would not 'negotiate' with the unions 
because the changes it was seeking 
were a matter of managerial preroga­
tive.
But the problem for APPM, and for the 
C o a litio n 's  em p hasis on direct 
em ployer-em p loyee ind ustrial 
relationships, was that its workers in­
sisted on union representation on the 
work practices issue. A clear majority 
of the 800 or so blue-collar workers at 
APPM's big pulp and paper mill in the 
conservative Tasmanian industrial 
town of Burnie were prepared to 
strike to defend the principle of union 
representation.
Union representation is one of the 
most potentially explosive issues in 
any industrial relations system, be­
cause it involves a fundam ental 
ideological clash between the compet­
ing notions of freedom of contract be­
tween individuals and the right of 
workers to organise collectively. This 
is why most western nations have 
taken the issue out of contention al­
together by establishing legal proce­
dures to determine union recognition 
and bargaining rights.
In Australia, after the massive in­
dustrial conflicts over union repre­
sentation in the 1890s, the issue was 
resolved by the adoption of the system 
of compulsory arbitration. The ar­
bitration model was the brainchild of 
an antipodean unity ticket of 19th cen­
tury liberals like Sir Charles Kingston 
and Fabian socialists like William 
Pember Reeves, who believed state in­
tervention could render industrial 
disputation obsolete. Under the ar­
bitration system unions gained legal 
rights to represent workers and be 
recognised by employers as bargain­
ing agents through their registration 
with state and federal arbitration 
tribunals.
By contrast in the North American col­
lective bargaining systems the state 
abstains from regulating industrial 
relations. But even these more volun­
tarist systems are generally under­
pinned by a leg islative code 
establishing union rights and requir­
ing employers to negotiate 'in good 
faith'.
The main exception to this is New 
Zealand, which began dismantling its 
compulsory arbitration system under 
the Labour government in the late 
1980s and has now moved to an al­
m ost com pletely  voluntarist 
framework for industrial relations 
under the National government. 
Under New Zealand's 1991 Employ­
ment Contracts Act, employers and 
employees are free to choose whom­
soever they like to represent them in 
negotiating either individual or col­
lective em ploym ent con tracts. 
Unions' former exclusive rights to 
represent workers in particular oc­
cupations or industries have been 
abolished. And no new mechanisms 
to regulate how employees choose 
their bargaining agent have replaced 
them. Where an employee authorises 
a bargaining agent, the employer is 
required to recognise that authority— 
but is not required to reach a settle­
ment, to bargain in good faith, or even 
to enter into negotiations.
In Australia during the 1980s in­
dustrial relations was one of the areas 
of principle most clearly dividing the 
major parties. But since the govem- 
m ent-A CTU  drive for a m ore 
decentralised wages system under 
last year's so-called Accord Mark VI 
agreement the federal Coalition has 
had difficulty in portraying its in­
dustrial relations policies as a genuine 
alternative.
The existing Coalition industrial rela­
tions policy retains the compulsory 
arbitration system but opens up a new 
stream of enterprise-level 'voluntary 
employment agreements' to replace 
industrial awards where employers 
and employees both agree to 'opt out' 
of the arbitration system. This would 
effectively retain the existing arbitra­
tion system as a safety net for cases 
where employers and employees do 
not agree on whether to opt out.
But the Coalition is now revising its 
industrial relations policy, and it is 
considering embracing the far more 
radical, New Zealand-style model. 
This approach would turn 'opting 
out' on its head. The industrial rela­
tions parties would automatically be 
ejected from the arbitration system 
into the deregulated stream of volun­
tary employment agreements unless 
they both agreed to 'opt in' to the ex­
isting award stream. Compulsory 
third-party arbitration of industrial 
disputes would be abolished, and 
union representation would be up for 
grabs. Closed shops would be out­
lawed, while new enterprise unions 
would be formed in w orkplaces 
where existing unions already have 
coverage. Individual employment
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contracts would legally override in­
dustrial awards.
Dr Hewson has already declared 
labour market deregulation to be the 
centrepiece of the C o a litio n 's  
Fightback! manifesto, and he admits to 
being attracted to what he terms New 
Zealand's 'big bang' approach to 
policy change. But industrial relations 
spokesperson John Howard—a com­
mitted industrial relations volun­
tarist—appears to be concerned about 
the political practicality of such a radi­
cal policy blueprint. Asked recently 
what he thought of the 'big bang' ap­
proach, he described it as 'a very mis­
leading term'.
In each of the last two federal elections 
the Coalition has attempted to portray 
industrial relations as a major issue, 
yet the electorate has shown far more 
interest in whether the trains are on 
strike than on the respective merits of 
centralised versus decentralised 
wages systems. Thus the dilemma for 
the Coalition: how can it sharpen the 
'product differentiation' between the 
major parties' industrial relations 
policies without exposing itself to the 
charge that its policy would generate 
industrial conflict and confrontation?
This is where APPM comes in. By 
demonstrating the degree of conflict 
that can be unleashed by disputes 
over union representation, the dispute 
at APPM has throw n into focus 
several questions about how a volun­
tarist industrial relations system in 
Australia would work. What happens 
under C oalition  p olicy  when 
employees exercise their freedom of 
choice in favour of union repre­
sentation but the employer steadfastly 
insists upon dealing with individuals 
rather than unions? Under the 1988 
Coalition 'opting out' formula the 
award and arbitration system would 
presumably continue to operate. But 
under a New Zealand-style policy 
which abolished compulsory arbitra­
tion, either side would be able to veto 
any reference of an industrial dispute 
to a third party for arbitration.
In the absence of either arbitration or 
legislative regulation of bargaining 
Procedures, such disputes would very 
likely degenerate into protracted trials 
°f industrial strength. Em ployers 
Would stockpile their products in an­
ticipation of long strikes or lockouts 
(APPM imported more than 6 million 
tonnes of paper before the dispute
began). Unions would amass strike 
funds to sustain their troops through 
the hardship of long stoppages (the 
ACTU set up a $5 million fighting 
fund during the APPM dispute).
But Australia provides less legal 
protection for workers who engage in 
industrial action than just about any 
other western nation (even post- 
Thatcher Britain and voluntarist New 
Zealand provide more legal recogni­
tion of a limited right to strike than 
does Australia). Hence the balance of 
bargaining power under such a 
regime would be tilted in favour of 
employers.
If the Coalition decides to plump for 
the more radical industrial policies it 
is currently examining, the federal 
government will no doubt remind the 
electorate assiduously of the violence 
on the Burnie picket lines. The chal­
lenge for John Howard will be to con­
vince the electorate that the Liberal 
policy does not condem n 1990s 
Australia to a replay of the great in­
dustrial conflicts over legal repre­
sentation of the 1890s.
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